11 ideas
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |