13 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
| 9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |