49 ideas
13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |