15 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |