Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Introduction - Ontology' and 'Brainchildren'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]