16 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |