16 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
| 19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
| 19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
| 19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
| 19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
| 19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
| 19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
| 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
| 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |