19 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |