Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic', 'fragments/reports' and 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]
Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]