Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'', 'Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
14713 Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23445 Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23447 In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
23443 The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
23444 To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
23446 You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
23448 Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
23441 Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
23442 Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
14712 A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]