Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aquinas, Thomas', 'Properties' and 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
22110 Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]