Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Russell's Mathematical Logic', 'Function and Concept' and 'Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction''

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction theories build mathematics out of second-order equivalence principles [Cook/Ebert]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]