17 ideas
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
| 6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
| 6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
| 6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
| 22808 | Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22803 | Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22804 | Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22806 | Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit] |
| 22807 | If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit] |