Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Briefings on Existence' and 'The Problem of Consciousness'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
12330 In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
12318 The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
12325 Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
12324 Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
12337 There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
12321 The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12342 Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12341 Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
12335 Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou]
12334 There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
12333 Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou]
12322 Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
12327 The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
12329 If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
12328 Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12331 Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12340 There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
12323 Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
12332 The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
12326 The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12320 Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
7388 McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3185 Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
12338 We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
12316 For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
12317 The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou]