Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Causation and the Manifestation of Powers' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11257 The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
11235 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11277 Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11248 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
17527 Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
17528 The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]