Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'What is Justified Belief?' and 'Possible Worlds'

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16 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8830 A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
8832 If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8829 Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]