18 ideas
| 8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
| 8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
| 8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
| 8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |