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All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Problems of Philosophy'

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168 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell]
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell]
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H]
There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell]
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell]
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]