122 ideas
11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |