Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative' and 'Mind in a Physical World'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]