Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'On 'Insolubilia' and their solution' and 'Truly Understood'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
21563 The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
21565 Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21564 Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]