Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Reality is Not What it Seems' and 'Possible Worlds'

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
20457 Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
20468 Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
20467 Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
20469 There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
20461 The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
20462 Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
20463 There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
20464 The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
20459 Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
20460 Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
20466 Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
20465 Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
20458 The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
20470 Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]