Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Letters' and 'Negative Dialectics'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If philosophy could be summarised it would be pointless [Adorno]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume]