Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Introduction to Philosophical Papers I' and 'Constructibility and Mathematical Existence'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21461 I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
8758 We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10265 Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
8759 We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
10264 Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]