Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Epistemology Externalized' and 'Ontological Categories'

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13134 We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13124 Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
13117 How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
13116 Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
13118 Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
13125 Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
13126 Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
13130 Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13131 The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13123 All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
13115 Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
13119 Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
13135 A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13129 Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
8872 It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
8874 It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
8873 The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson]