Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Two Kinds of Possibility' and 'The Nature of Rationality'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22664 I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22665 Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
12205 There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12206 Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
12208 An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
22662 In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
22666 Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
22667 Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
22663 Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]