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All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction' and 'On Concept and Object'

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
20298 The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
20300 Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
20294 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey]
20293 Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey]
20297 Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey]
20301 The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey]
20302 An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey]
20303 Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
20299 If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]