Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'The Theodicy' and 'On the Natural Faculties'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]