Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'De arcanus motus' and 'Letters to Samuel Clarke'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
2098 The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
3646 There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
2104 No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19385 All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21346 The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12733 Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12734 Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
2105 Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
2106 The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
2102 Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20965 Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
2103 The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2100 Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
2107 No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
2101 If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
22894 If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
2099 The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]