25 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |