Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'New System and Explanation of New System' and 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz]