Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Letters to Russell' and 'Letter to Weber'

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13 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
18253 I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
18244 I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
18166 The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
18269 Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]