Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'On Liberty' and 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology'

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86 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J]
Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill]
True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill]
Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill]
Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill]
Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill]
Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill]