19 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |