Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Introduction to the Theory of Logic' and 'On Probability and Induction'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22361 Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10888 Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
10889 The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
10890 A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10886 Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
10887 Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10897 A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10893 Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
10899 Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
10896 Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10898 The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
10902 We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10892 We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10895 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
10900 Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10901 Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
10894 A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10903 A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
10891 If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]