Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Machine Man' and 'An Introduction to Modal Logic'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
9540 A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
9541 The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
9543 The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
9544 A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
7647 The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
7645 When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
23225 The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7652 Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
7650 All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7651 With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
7648 The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
7646 There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
7649 There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]