78 ideas
5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |