Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
12302 Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
14266 Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
14268 Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
14265 The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]