Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'works'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
8720 A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]