Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Apology for Raymond Sebond' and 'Causality and Determinism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
6259 Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
6263 No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
6258 Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
6262 We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6260 Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
6261 The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
8353 Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8352 To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8351 With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
4777 The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10363 Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8350 Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]