Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'The Dappled World' and 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori'

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14 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14633 How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
14635 An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14632 Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
14631 How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
17503 Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides]