15 ideas
| 7081 | Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath] |
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| 11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |