Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory' and 'Non-Monotonic Logic'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19115 You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
19119 We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
19111 Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
19114 Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
19113 Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
19116 Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
19117 We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
19118 People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
19110 In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
19112 Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22137 Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
18197 Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem]