Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'The Principles of Art' and 'Sameness and Substance'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
16512 Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17529 Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
17530 The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
16523 Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
16524 Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
16526 Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16492 Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
16493 Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
16496 Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
16509 Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
16514 Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
16510 Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16503 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
16499 A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
16515 A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
16517 Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16497 Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
16502 Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
16498 Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16521 A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16505 By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16494 We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16522 It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
16525 Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
16518 We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
16511 A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20420 The emotion expressed is non-conscious, but feels oppressive until expression relieves it [Collingwood]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20421 Art exists ideally, purely as experiences in the mind of the perceiver [Collingwood, by Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
20406 Art clarifies the artist's mind and feelings, thus leading to self-knowledge [Collingwood, by Davies,S]