Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Action, Intention and Reason' and 'Letter to Menoeceus'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14052 Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
14062 Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
1837 We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
1836 Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
14061 Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14053 It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
14055 The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
14054 Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1833 Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
14057 All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
14058 Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
14063 Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
14059 The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
1835 True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
14056 We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
14060 Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]