Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Assertion' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]