Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Persistence, Change and Explanation' and 'Human Freedom and the Self'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
13931 By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13925 Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
13924 The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
13930 Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
13928 If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
13926 Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
3446 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
9268 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
3442 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
3443 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]