Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Is There a Marxist Doctrine?' and 'Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
17641 Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17638 If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
17632 Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23877 Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17629 Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
17630 The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
17640 Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17627 It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17628 Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
17637 The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17639 Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
17631 Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
23878 Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
23879 In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
23880 When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17633 The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]