31 ideas
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
7508 | Good reductionism connects fields of knowledge, but doesn't replace one with another [Pinker] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
7510 | Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker] |
7513 | Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker] |
7509 | Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker] |
7511 | Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions [Pinker] |
7512 | There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
7505 | Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker] |
7516 | In 1828, the stuff of life was shown to be ordinary chemistry, not a magic gel [Pinker] |
7515 | All the evidence says evolution is cruel and wasteful, not intelligent [Pinker] |
7514 | Intelligent Design says that every unexplained phenomenon must be design, by default [Pinker] |