Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Contextualism Defended' and 'Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12893 Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
12896 Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
12894 There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]